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Impact of Decision Rules and Non-Cooperative Behaviors on 
Minimum Consensus Cost in Group Decision Making 
Abstract: In group decision making (GDM), it is sensible to achive minimum consensus 
cost (MCC) because the consensus reaching process (CRP) resources are often limited. In this 
endeavour, though, there are still two issues that require paying attention to: (1) the impact of 
decision rules, including decision weights and aggregation functions, on MCC; and (2) the 
impact of non-cooperative behaviors on MCC. Hence, this paper analytically reveals the 
decision rules to minimize MCC or maximize MCC. Furthermore, detailed simulation 
experiments show the joint impact of non-cooperative behavior and decisions rules on MCC, 
as well as revealing the effect of the consensus within the established MCC target. 
Keywords: Group decision making; Consensus; Cost; Decision rules; Non-cooperative 
behaviors; Simulation experiment. 
1. Introduction
Group decision-making (GDM) can be viewed as a process where a group of decision
makers express their opinions and aim at achieving a collective solution. Consensus reaching 
process (CRP) is a key issue in GDM by which decision makers are assisted to achieve 
consensus regarding certain collective solution. Traditionally, “hard” consensus in GDM 
considers only a lack of consensus state or a state of full or unanimous, which is inconvenient 
and unnecessary in real life (Kacprzyk et al., 1997, 2010; Kacprzyk & Zadrożny, 2010, 2016). 
Thus, different consensus reaching processes (CRPs) based on a “soft” consensus measure in 
GDM have been proposed, with some excellent reviews on CRP available in (Herrera-Viedma 
et al., 2014; Palomares et al., 2014a). In particular, the minimum consensus cost (MCC) and 
non-cooperative behaviors are becoming hot topics in CRPs. 
Generally, preference changing are associated a cost and the resources for consensus 
building are limited (Ben-Arieh & Easton, 2007; Dong et al., 2010, 2015; Dong & Xu, 2016; 
Gong et al., 2017, 2019;  Tan et al., 2018 ). Based on these premises, some CRPs with MCC 
have been developed (Ben-Arieh & Easton, 2007; Ben-Arieh et al., 2008; Cheng et al., 2018; 
Gong et al., 2015a, 2015b; Zhang et al., 2017, 2019b). Notably, Zhang et al. (2019c) 
investigated the consensus efficiency of existing CRPs with MCC and provided detailed 
simulation experiments based on the following comparison criteria: the number of adjusted 
decision makers; the number of adjusted alternatives; the number of adjusted preference 
values; the distance between the original and the adjusted preference information; and the 
number of negotiation rounds required to reach consensus. 
In GDM problems, decision makers may behave uncooperatively by expressing dishonest 
opinions or refusing to change their opinions to favor their own profit. Two mainstream 
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research approaches have been developed in the literature to effectively address 
non-cooperative behaviors and ensure the quality of the GDM results: (1) managing 
non-cooperative behaviors in the aggregation process or selection process in the GDM, which 
focuses on the influence of the non-cooperative behaviors on the aggregation outcome (Dong 
et al., 2017; Pelta & Yager, 2010; Yager, 2001, 2002); (2) managing non-cooperative 
behaviors in the consensus process of the GDM, which mainly analyzes whether a consensus 
solution can be achieved under the presence of non-cooperative behaviors in the CRP (Dong 
et al., 2016, 2018b; Palomares et al., 2014b; Quesada et al., 2014). 
   Although numerous studies have been presented to analyze the MCC and non-cooperative 
behaviors in CRPs, there still exist two issues that need to be dealt with: the impact of the 
decision rules and of non-cooperative behaviors on MCC. 
(i) Impact of decision rules on MCC. In existing CRP studies, decision rules include 
decision weights and aggregation functions. It is natural that setting decision rules will 
lead to different consensus outcomes and will have an effect on the consensus cost. For 
example, in the selection of outstanding research projects, choosing different 
aggregation functions and decision weights can lead to different consensus outcome 
and cost. However, the existing research about MCC is to develop some consensus 
models under the given decision rules and decision weights, and it is still not clear how 
decision rules influence the minimum cost in reaching consensus in GDM.
(ii) Impact of non-cooperative behaviors on MCC. Although non-cooperative behaviors 
have been extensively studied, the existing research about non-cooperative behaviors 
focuses on the mangement of non-cooperative behaviors in CRPs, and it is still unclear 
how non-cooperative behaviors influence on the MCC in CRPs. Therefore, it is 
necessary to reveal the internal mechanism of the non-cooperative behaviors impact on 
MCC. 
This paper focuses on these two issues and it presents the following research contributions 
on the impact of decision rules and non-cooperative behaviors on MCC in GDM: 
(i) From a theoretical point of view, it is proved that the decision rule that minimizes MCC
can be modeled with the ordered weighted average (OWA) with decision weigh 𝑤 =
(0.5,0,… ,0,0.5)𝑇, while the decision rule that maximize the MCC is modeled with the
OWA with decision weight 𝑤 = (1,0,… ,0)𝑇 or 𝑤 = (0,… ,0,1)𝑇.
(ii) From an analytical point of view, Simulation experiments I, II and III are designed to
show that the non-cooperative behaviors strongly increase the MCC. The MCC
increases with an increase on the number of decision makers. This positive relationship
is more obvious when decision makers are less tolerant to inconsistent views or the
non-cooperative behaviors in the group are high. We also show non-cooperative
behaviors is a more determiner factor in influencing the MCC than decision rules.
Furthermore, the effect of the consensus within the established target on MCC is also 
studied in the simulation experiments. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the general CRP 
framework and the minimum-cost consensus model. Section 3 is devoted to the theoretical 
study to reveal of decision rules impact on MCC. Section 4 provides an analytical study with 
Simulation experiment I, II and III to further reveals the impact of non-cooperative behaviors 
and decision rules on MCC. Lastly, Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Background
This section briefly describes the general CRP framework and the minimum-cost consensus
model, which will provide the basis of this study. 
2.1 The general CRP framework 
The general CRP framework is depicted in Fig. 1 (Herrera-Viedma et al., 2002; Zhang et al., 
2011). Once the individual experts provide their opinions, an aggregation function is carried 
out to derive the collective opinion. Then, the consensus level among the group of decision 
makers is measured by looking at the difference between the individual opinions and the 
collective opinion. If the consensus level is lower than an apriority acceptable consensus 
threshold value, then a feedback process is carried out to provide support to the decision 
makers to adjust their individual opinions with the aim of increasing the group 
consensus. This procedure is repeated for a maximum number of consensus rounds or until 
the group consensus level reaches the threshold level, whichever comes first. 
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Fig. 1 Framework of the general CRP. 
2.2 Minimum-Cost Consensus Model 
In a GDM problem, let 𝐷 = {𝑑1, 𝑑2, … , 𝑑𝑛}  be the set of decision makers, 𝑊 =
(𝑤1, 𝑤2, … , 𝑤𝑛)
𝑇  the associated decision makers weights vector, where 𝑤𝑖 ≥ 0 (𝑖 =
1,2,… , 𝑛) and ∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 = 1;  𝐴 = {𝑎1, 𝑎2, … , 𝑎𝑛} be the set of individual opinions, where
𝑎𝑖 ∈ [0,1] represents the decision maker 𝑑𝑖’s opinion on an alternative.
The minimum-cost consensus model includes three parts: 
(1) Consensus measurement. Several methods can be used to measure the consensus level
in a GDM problem (Fedrizzi, 1988; Kacprzyk et al., 1922). The most common is based on the 
use of a distance based measure, which is the one employed in the minimum-cost consensus 
model presented in (Chiclana et al., 2013). Let the collective opinion be represented by 𝑎𝑐.
The consensus level of the decision maker 𝑑𝑖 can be measured using the value |𝑎𝑖 − 𝑎
𝑐|
(𝑖 = 1,2,… , 𝑛). Let 𝜀 be a threshold value (Herrera-Viedma et al., 2002). If  
|𝑎𝑖 − 𝑎
𝑐| ≤ 𝜀, for all 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛,                         (1)
then all decision makers are considered to have reached an acceptable consensus. Otherwise, 
the decision makers need to adjust their opinions to increase the consensus level. 
(2) Consensus cost. Let 𝑎𝑖 ∈ 𝐴 denote the adjusted individual opinion of decision maker
𝑑𝑖, and let 𝑎𝑐 be the adjusted collective opinion. Ben-Arieh and Easton (2007) assumed that
moving 𝑑𝑖 ’s opinion 1 unit has associated a cost 𝑐𝑖 ∈ [0,+∞), and defined the linear
consensus cost of moving 𝑑𝑖’s opinion from 𝑎𝑖 to 𝑎𝑖 as 𝑐𝑖|𝑎𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖|. Thus, it is natural to
minimize the consensus cost, i.e.,  
𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑎𝑖
∑ 𝑐𝑖|𝑎𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖|
𝑛
𝑖=1 .    (2) 
(3) Aggregation function. In GDM problems, aggregation functions are used to fuse
individuals’ opinions to form a collective opinion (Akram et al., 2018, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c; 
Dong et al., 2010; Ogryczak & Śliwiński, 2003; Zhang et al., 2019a). The weighted average 
(WA) and ordered weighted average (OWA) operators are the most important aggregation 
functions in GDM problems (Dong et al., 2010; Ogryczak & Śliwiński, 2003; Zhang et al., 
2011), which are defined by Eqs. (3) and (4), respectively.  
𝐹𝑊𝐴(𝑎1, 𝑎2, … , 𝑎𝑛) = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑎𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 , (3) 
𝐹𝑂𝑊𝐴(𝑎1, 𝑎2, … , 𝑎𝑛) = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑎(𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1 , (4) 
where 𝑎(𝑖) is the 𝑖th largest element of 𝐴 = {𝑎1, 𝑎2, … , 𝑎𝑛}, and 𝑊 = (𝑤1, 𝑤2, … , 𝑤𝑛)
𝑇 is
the associated weight vector. 
   In minimum-cost consensus model, the WA and OWA operators are employed to 
aggregate individuals’ opinion to obtain the collective decision option 𝑎𝑐,i.e.,
𝑎𝑐 = 𝐹𝑊(𝑎1, 𝑎2, … , 𝑎𝑛).                           (5)
Formally, Zhang et al. (2011) proposed the following minimum-cost consensus model with 




∑ 𝑐𝑖|𝑎𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖|
𝑛
𝑖=1  
  𝑎𝑐 = 𝐹𝑊(𝑎1, 𝑎2, … , 𝑎𝑛) 
|𝑎𝑖 − 𝑎
𝑐| ≤ 𝜀, 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛
. (6) 
In this study, we denote this model as P1. Solving P1 yields the optimal adjusted opinions. 
Similarly, the respective minimum-cost consensus models with aggregation functions OWA 




∑ 𝑐𝑖|𝑎𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖|
𝑛
𝑖=1  
  𝑎𝑐 = 𝐹𝑂𝑊𝐴(𝑎1, 𝑎2, … , 𝑎𝑛) 
|𝑎𝑖 − 𝑎
𝑐| ≤ 𝜀, 𝑖 = 1,2,… , 𝑛




∑ 𝑐𝑖|𝑎𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖|
𝑛
𝑖=1  
  𝑎𝑐 = 𝐹𝑊𝐴(𝑎1, 𝑎2, … , 𝑎𝑛) 
|𝑎𝑖 − 𝑎
𝑐| ≤ 𝜀, 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛
. (8) 
3. Impact of decision rules on minimum consensus cost
In a CRP, the aggregation function and its associated decision weight play the role of the
decision rules. This section reveals the impact of decision rules on MCC. 
3.1 The decision rule to minimize MCC   
The solution of the model P4 below will be the optimal adjusted collective opinion that 










𝑐| ≤ 𝜀, 𝑖 = 1,2,… , 𝑛
. (9) 











𝑎𝑖) 2⁄  
|𝑎𝑖 − 𝑎
𝑐| ≤ 𝜀, 𝑖 = 1,2,… , 𝑛
. (10) 
The following results show that the optimal solution of model P5 is also the optimal 
solution of model P4. 
Theorem 1: Let 𝑎𝑖
∗ (𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛) and 𝑎𝑐∗  denote the optimal adjusted individual
opinions and adjusted collective opinion obtained by solving model P5. Then, 
{𝑎1
∗ , 𝑎2
∗ , … , 𝑎𝑛
∗ , 𝑎𝑐∗} is the optimal solution of model P4. 
Proof: 
Let {𝑎1̿̿ ̿, 𝑎2̿̿ ̿, … , 𝑎𝑛̿̿ ̿, 𝑎
𝑐̿̿ ̿} be the optimal solution of model P4, and Ω4  its feasible set.
Similarly, let {𝑎1
∗, 𝑎2
∗ , … , 𝑎𝑛
∗ , 𝑎𝑐∗} be the optimal solution of model P5, and Ω5 its feasible
set.  
Based on the condition |𝑎𝑖 − 𝑎
𝑐| ≤ 𝜀 (𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛) of model P4, then we would get
𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑎𝑖




[∑ 𝑐𝑖(𝑎𝑐 − 𝜀 − 𝑎𝑖)𝑖:𝑎𝑖<𝑎𝑐−𝜀 +














𝑐 − 𝜀 − 𝑎𝑖)𝑖:𝑎𝑖<𝑎𝑐−𝜀
+ ∑ 𝑐𝑖(𝑎𝑖 − 𝜀 − 𝑎
𝑐)𝑖:𝑎𝑖>𝑎𝑐+𝜀




𝑐 − 𝜀 − 𝑎𝑖)𝑖:𝑎𝑖<𝑎𝑐−𝜀
+ ∑ 𝑐𝑖(𝑎𝑖 − 𝜀 − 𝑎
𝑐)𝑖:𝑎𝑖>𝑎𝑐+𝜀
] 









∑ 𝑐𝑖|𝑎𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖|
𝑛
𝑖=1 .   (13) 








𝑐| ≤ 𝜀, 𝑖 = 1,2,… , 𝑛
.  (14) 
Thus, {𝑎1̿̿ ̿, 𝑎2̿̿ ̿, … , 𝑎𝑛̿̿ ̿, 𝑎
𝑐̿̿ ̿} and Ω4 also represent the optimal solution and the feasible set
of Eq. (14). Therefore, Ω5 ⊆ Ω4, and we have that:











∑ 𝑐𝑖|𝑎𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖|
𝑛
𝑖=1      (15) 
= ∑ 𝑐𝑖|𝑎𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖
∗|𝑛𝑖=1 . 
Moreover, the relationship between 𝑎𝑐̿̿ ̿ and ?̿?𝑖 is:
?̿?𝑖 = {
𝑎𝑐̿̿ ̿ − 𝜀,    𝑖 ∈ {𝑖: 𝑎𝑖 ≤ 𝑎
𝑐̿̿ ̿ − 𝜀}
𝑎𝑐̿̿ ̿ + 𝜀,    𝑖 ∈ {𝑖: 𝑎𝑖 ≥ 𝑎
𝑐̿̿ ̿ + 𝜀}
𝑎𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ {𝑖: 𝑎
𝑐̿̿ ̿ − 𝜀 < 𝑎𝑖 < 𝑎






 ?̿?𝑖 ≤ 2𝜀.




 ?̿?𝑖) 2⁄ ]| ≤ 𝜀  for all  𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛 . Therefore,




 ?̿?𝑖) 2⁄ ]} ∈ Ω5. Consequently,





∑ 𝑐𝑖|𝑎𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖|
𝑛
𝑖=1
= ∑ 𝑐𝑖|𝑎𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖
∗|𝑛𝑖=1 . (17) 
From Eqs. (15) and (17), it is: 
∑ 𝑐𝑖|𝑎𝑖 − ?̿?𝑖|
𝑛
𝑖=1 = ∑ 𝑐𝑖|𝑎𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖
∗|𝑛𝑖=1 . (18) 
Thus, {𝑎1
∗ , 𝑎2
∗ , … , 𝑎𝑛
∗ , 𝑎𝑐∗} is the optimal solution to model P4. 
This completes the proof of Theorem 1. 
In the following, we further derive the decision rule between the optimal adjusted collective 
opinion and the optimal individual opinions of model P4. Based on Theorem 1, 
{𝑎1
∗ , 𝑎2
∗ , … , 𝑎𝑛
∗ , 𝑎𝑐∗} is the optimal solution of model P4, which still satisfies the functional 






∗) 2⁄  of model P5, i.e. the decision rule that minimizes
the MCC of model P4 is: 
𝑎𝑐 = 𝐹𝑂𝑊𝐴(𝑎1, 𝑎2, … , 𝑎𝑛), (19) 
with decision weight vector 
𝑂𝑊𝐴_𝑚𝑖𝑛 = (0.5,0,… ,0,0.5)𝑇. (20) 
3.2 The decision rule to maximize MCC 
Solving the next model P6 will lead to the optimal adjusted collective opinion that 










𝑐| ≤ 𝜀, 𝑖 = 1,2,… , 𝑛
. (21) 
First, we provide the following result regarding the optimal solution of model P6 
Lemma 1: Let {𝑜1, 𝑜2, … , 𝑜𝑛, 𝑜







Since {𝑜1, 𝑜2, … , 𝑜𝑛, 𝑜
𝑐}  is the optimal solution of model P1. Let {𝑏1, 𝑏2, … , 𝑏𝑛, 𝑏
𝑐} ,
{𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑛, 𝑒
𝑐} , {𝑓1, 𝑓2, … , 𝑓𝑛, 𝑓
𝑐} , and  {𝑔1, 𝑔2, … , 𝑔𝑛, 𝑔
𝑐}  denote feasible solutions of





𝑎𝑖 , 1], 𝑓
𝑐 = min
𝑖
𝑎𝑖  and 𝑔
𝑐 = max
𝑖
𝑎𝑖  and 𝜀




𝑀𝐶𝐶1 = ∑ 𝑐𝑖|𝑎𝑖 − 𝑏𝑖|
𝑛
𝑖=1 = ∑ 𝑐𝑖(𝑎𝑖 − 𝑏𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1 . (22)
(ii) For 𝑒𝑐ϵ (max
𝑖
𝑎𝑖 , 1], then
𝑀𝐶𝐶2 = ∑ 𝑐𝑖|𝑎𝑖 − 𝑒𝑖|
𝑛
𝑖=1 = ∑ 𝑐𝑖(𝑒𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖)
𝑛





𝑀𝐶𝐶3 = ∑ 𝑐𝑖|𝑎𝑖 − 𝑓𝑖|
𝑛
𝑖=1 = ∑ 𝑐𝑖(𝑎𝑖 − 𝑓𝑖)
𝑛





𝑀𝐶𝐶2 = ∑ 𝑐𝑖|𝑎𝑖 − 𝑔𝑖|
𝑛
𝑖=1 = ∑ 𝑐𝑖(𝑔𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1 . (25) 
Based on Eqs. (22) and (24), it is 
𝑀𝐶𝐶1 −𝑀𝐶𝐶3 = ∑ 𝑐𝑖(𝑎𝑖 − 𝑏𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1 − ∑ 𝑐𝑖(𝑎𝑖 − 𝑓𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1 = ∑ 𝑐𝑖(𝑓𝑖 − 𝑏𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1 . (26) 
The feasible solutions {𝑏1, 𝑏2, … , 𝑏𝑛, 𝑏
𝑐} and {𝑓1, 𝑓2, … , 𝑓𝑛, 𝑓
𝑐} satisfy the condition
|𝑏1 − 𝑏
𝑐| ≤ 𝜀 and |𝑓1 − 𝑓
𝑐| ≤ 𝜀 (𝑖 = 1,2,… , 𝑛) of model P1，then 𝑓𝑖 ≥ 𝑓
𝑐 − 𝜀 and 𝑏𝑖 ≤
𝑏𝑐 + 𝜀 (for all 𝑖 = 1,2,… , 𝑛), hence
𝑀𝐶𝐶1 −𝑀𝐶𝐶3 = ∑ 𝑐𝑖(𝑓𝑖 − 𝑏𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1 ≥ ∑ 𝑐𝑖(𝑓
𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐 − 2𝜀)𝑛𝑖=1 . (27) 
When 𝜀 tends to 0, ∑ 𝑐𝑖(𝑓
𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐 − 2𝜀)𝑛𝑖=1 tends to ∑ 𝑐𝑖(𝑓
𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐)𝑛𝑖=1 > 0 and therefore
it is  
 𝑀𝐶𝐶1 −𝑀𝐶𝐶3 > 0. (28) 
Thus, 𝑀𝐶𝐶1 > 𝑀𝐶𝐶3.
Based on Eqs. (23) and (25), we have 
𝑀𝐶𝐶2 −𝑀𝐶𝐶4 = ∑ 𝑐𝑖(𝑒𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1 − ∑ 𝑐𝑖(𝑔𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1 = ∑ 𝑐𝑖(𝑒𝑖 − 𝑔𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1 .     (29)
The feasible solutions {𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑛, 𝑒
𝑐} and {𝑔1, 𝑔2, … , 𝑔𝑛, 𝑔
𝑐} satisfy the condition
|𝑒1 − 𝑒
𝑐| ≤ 𝜀 and |𝑔1 − 𝑔
𝑐| ≤ 𝜀 (𝑖 = 1,2,… , 𝑛) of model P1，then 𝑒𝑖 ≥ 𝑒
𝑐 − 𝜀 and 𝑔𝑖 ≤
𝑔𝑐 + 𝜀 (for all 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛), hence
𝑀𝐶𝐶2 −𝑀𝐶𝐶4 = ∑ 𝑐𝑖(𝑒𝑖 − 𝑔𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1 ≥ ∑ 𝑐𝑖(𝑒𝑖 − 𝑔𝑖 − 2𝜀)
𝑛
𝑖=1 . (30) 
Taking limits when 𝜀 tends to 0, we would get that 
 𝑀𝐶𝐶2 −𝑀𝐶𝐶4 ≥ ∑ 𝑐𝑖(𝑒𝑖 − 𝑔𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1 > 0. (31) 
Thus, 𝑀𝐶𝐶2 > 𝑀𝐶𝐶4.




𝑎𝑖 , 1] is excluded from the range of the






This completes the proof of Lemma 1. 
Theorem 2: Let {𝑝1, 𝑝2, … , 𝑝𝑛, 𝑝
























.   (32) 
Proof: 
The process of proving Theorem 2 is divided into two steps. 





The aim of solving model P1 is to obtain the optimal solution under the fixed decision rule, 
while solving model P6 aims at obtaining the optimal adjusted collective opinion that 
maximizes the MCC, which equals to finding the optimal decision rule that maximizes the 
MCC based on the Eq. (5).  
The MCC obtained with model P1 with this optimal decision rule is the largest of all MCC 
obtained with model P1 with any decision rule. Obviously, Lemma 1 still applies to model P6 
because the optimal solution {𝑝1, 𝑝2, … , 𝑝𝑛, 𝑝
𝑐} of model P6 is also the optimal solution of











Let {ℎ1, ℎ2, … , ℎ𝑛, ℎ
𝑐}, {𝑓1, 𝑓2, … , 𝑓𝑛, 𝑓
𝑐}, and {𝑔1, 𝑔2, … , 𝑔𝑛, 𝑔
𝑐} denote feasible solutions










𝑎𝑖 and 𝜀 is a small
enough number. 





𝑀𝐶𝐶1 = ∑ 𝑐𝑖|𝑎𝑖 − ℎ𝑖|
𝑛





𝑀𝐶𝐶2 = ∑ 𝑐𝑖|𝑎𝑖 − 𝑓𝑖|
𝑛
𝑖=1 = ∑ 𝑐𝑖(𝑎𝑖 − 𝑓𝑖)
𝑛





𝑀𝐶𝐶3 = ∑ 𝑐𝑖|𝑎𝑖 − 𝑔𝑖|
𝑛
𝑖=1 = ∑ 𝑐𝑖(𝑔𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1 = ∑ 𝑐𝑖(𝑔𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖)𝑖:ℎ𝑖≥𝑎𝑖 + ∑ 𝑐𝑖(𝑔𝑖 −𝑖:ℎ𝑖<𝑎𝑖
𝑎𝑖)(35)
Based on Eqs. (33) and (34), it is 
𝑀𝐶𝐶2 −𝑀𝐶𝐶1 = ∑ 𝑐𝑖(2𝑎𝑖 − 𝑓𝑖 − ℎ𝑖)𝑖:ℎ𝑖≥𝑎𝑖 +∑ 𝑐𝑖(ℎ𝑖 − 𝑓𝑖)𝑖:ℎ𝑖<𝑎𝑖
≥ ∑ 𝑐𝑖(2ℎ𝑖 − 𝑓𝑖 − ℎ𝑖)𝑖:ℎ𝑖≥𝑎𝑖 + ∑ 𝑐𝑖(ℎ𝑖 − 𝑓𝑖)𝑖:ℎ𝑖<𝑎𝑖    (36) 
≥ ∑ 𝑐𝑖(ℎ𝑖 − 𝑓𝑖)𝑖:ℎ𝑖≥𝑎𝑖 + ∑ 𝑐𝑖(ℎ𝑖 − 𝑓𝑖)𝑖:ℎ𝑖<𝑎𝑖
≥ ∑ 𝑐𝑖(ℎ𝑖 − 𝑓𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1 .
The feasible solutions {ℎ1, ℎ2, … , ℎ𝑛, ℎ
𝑐}  and {𝑓1, 𝑓2, … , 𝑓𝑛, 𝑓
𝑐}  satisfy the conditions
|ℎ1 − ℎ
𝑐| ≤ 𝜀 and |𝑓1 − 𝑓
𝑐| ≤ 𝜀 (𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛) of model P6，then ℎ𝑖 ≥ ℎ
𝑐 − 𝜀 and 𝑓𝑖 ≤
𝑓𝑐 + 𝜀 (for all 𝑖 = 1,2,… , 𝑛). Taking limits when 𝜀 tends to 0, we would get that
𝑀𝐶𝐶2 −𝑀𝐶𝐶1 ≥ ∑ 𝑐𝑖(ℎ
𝑐 − 𝑓𝑐)𝑛𝑖=1 > 0. (37) 
Based on Eqs. (33) and (35), it is 
𝑀𝐶𝐶3 −𝑀𝐶𝐶1 = ∑ 𝑐𝑖(𝑔𝑖 − ℎ𝑖)𝑖:ℎ𝑖≥𝑎𝑖 + ∑ 𝑐𝑖(𝑔𝑖 + ℎ𝑖 − 2𝑎𝑖)𝑖:ℎ𝑖<𝑎𝑖
≥ ∑ 𝑐𝑖(𝑔𝑖 − ℎ𝑖)𝑖:ℎ𝑖≥𝑎𝑖 + ∑ 𝑐𝑖(𝑔𝑖 + ℎ𝑖 − 2ℎ𝑖)𝑖:ℎ𝑖<𝑎𝑖 (38) 
≥ ∑ 𝑐𝑖(𝑔𝑖 − ℎ𝑖)𝑖:ℎ𝑖≥𝑎𝑖 + ∑ 𝑐𝑖(𝑔𝑖 − ℎ𝑖)𝑖:ℎ𝑖<𝑎𝑖
≥ ∑ 𝑐𝑖(𝑔𝑖 − ℎ𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1 .
The feasible solutions {ℎ1, ℎ2, … , ℎ𝑛, ℎ
𝑐} and {𝑔1, 𝑔2, … , 𝑔𝑛, 𝑔
𝑐} satisfy the conditions
|ℎ1 − ℎ
𝑐| ≤ 𝜀 and |𝑔1 − 𝑔
𝑐| ≤ 𝜀 (𝑖 = 1,2,… , 𝑛) of model P6，then ℎ𝑖 ≤ ℎ
𝑐 + 𝜀 and 𝑔𝑖 ≥
𝑔𝑐 − 𝜀 (for all 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛) . Simlarly, it would be
𝑀𝐶𝐶3 −𝑀𝐶𝐶1 ≥ ∑ 𝑐𝑖(𝑔
𝑐 − ℎ𝑐)𝑛𝑖=1 > 0. (39) 
From Eqs. (37) and (39), it can be concluded that 𝑀𝐶𝐶2 > 𝑀𝐶𝐶1 and 𝑀𝐶𝐶3 > 𝑀𝐶𝐶1




𝑎𝑖, the larger the




𝑝𝑖], this conclusion are guaranteed in the limit case, i.e.
𝑝𝑐 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑖













𝑝𝑖 , 𝑀𝐶𝐶3 > 𝑀𝐶𝐶2
min
𝑖
𝑝𝑖  , 𝑀𝐶𝐶3 < 𝑀𝐶𝐶2
  (40) 























This completes the proof of Theorem 2. 
Based on the Theorem 2, the decision rule that maximizes the MCC of model P6 is 
𝑎𝑐 = 𝐹𝑂𝑊𝐴(𝑎1, 𝑎2, … , 𝑎𝑛), (42) 
with the following associated decision weight vector 
𝑂𝑊𝐴_𝑚𝑎𝑥 = {




















In this section, we further reveal the impact of non-cooperative behaviors and decision 
rules on MCC via Simulation experiments I, II and III. In the minimum-cost consensus model, 
𝑐𝑖 denotes the cost of moving 𝑑𝑖’s opinion 1 unit, and in this study we argue that it can
represent the non-cooperative behavior coefficient of decision maker 𝑑𝑖 because larger 𝑐𝑖
values means less cooperation to reach consensus. Thus, 𝐶 = {𝑐1, 𝑐2, … , 𝑐𝑛} is considered to
be the set of non-cooperative behavior coefficients. Meanwhile, we argue that the decision 
rules consist of the aggregation function and the associated decision weight.  
4.1 Simulation experiment I: Impact of non-cooperative behaviors on MCC 
The basic idea of Simulation experiment I is to randomly generate original individual 
opinions and values of 𝑐𝑖 (𝑖 = 1,2,… , 𝑛). Particularly, 𝑐𝑖 is randomly generated based on
the normal distribution 𝑁(𝜇𝑐 , 𝜎𝑐
2)  subject to the constraint 𝑐𝑖 > 0 , where 𝜇𝑐  and 𝜎𝑐
2
approximately measure the expectation and variance of 𝑑𝑖 ’s non-cooperative behavior
coefficient, respectively. Thus, we study the impact of non-cooperative behaviors on MCC 
through 𝜇𝑐 and 𝜎𝑐
2. Simulation experiment I can be formally presented as follows.
Simulation experiment I: 
Input: The number of decision makers 𝑛 , the expectation of 𝑑𝑖 ’s non-cooperative
behavior coefficient 𝜇𝑐, the variance of 𝑑𝑖’s non-cooperative behavior coefficient 𝜎𝑐
2, the
established threshold value ε and decision weight 𝑤 = (𝑤1, 𝑤2, … , 𝑤𝑛)
𝑇.
Output: The minimum consensus cost, MCC. 
Step 1: Let 𝐴 = {𝑎1, 𝑎2, … , 𝑎𝑛} be the original individual opinion set in model P2, where
𝑎𝑖 (𝑖 = 1,2,… , 𝑛) is randomly selected using the uniform distribution on [0,1].
Step 2: Let 𝐶 = {𝑐1, 𝑐2, … , 𝑐𝑛} be the set of non-cooperative behavior coefficients in
model P2, where  𝑐𝑖 (𝑖 = 1,2,… , 𝑛) is randomly generated based on 𝑁(𝜇𝑐 , 𝜎𝑐
2) subject to
the constraint 𝑐𝑖 > 0.
Step 3: Compute the MCC based on model P2. 
Without loss of generality, in the simulation we consider two decision rules: 
𝑂𝑊𝐴1 = (1 𝑛⁄ ,… , 1 𝑛⁄ )
𝑇 and 𝑂𝑊𝐴2 = (0, 1 (𝑛 − 2)⁄ ,… , 1 (𝑛 − 2)⁄ , 0)
𝑇.
We set different values for 𝑛, 𝜀, 𝜇𝑐, 𝜎𝑐
2 and run Simulation experiment I 10,000 times to
calculate the average of the MCC values, which is shown in Figs. 2 and 3.  
Fig. 2 Effects of 𝜇𝑐 and 𝜎𝑐
2 on the MCC under different parameters
Fig. 3 Effects of 𝜀 and 𝑛 on the MCC under different parameters 
From Figs. 2 and 3, we draw the following observations:  
(1) Fig. 2 shows that the MCC increases as  𝜇𝑐  and  𝜎𝑐
2  increase under different
parameters. This implies that the non-cooperative behaviors in the group, defined by  𝜇𝑐 and
𝜎𝑐
2, strongly increase the MCC, which translates in an increase in the difficulty when reaching
consensus in GDM.  
(2) Fig. 3 shows that the MCC increases as 𝑛 increases under different parameters, being
this increment more significant the smaller 𝜀 values or the larger 𝜎𝑐
2 values are, respectively.
This agrees with the real increase of difficulty in reaching consensus the larger the group 
experts. Meanwhile, the number of decision makers will have a stronger impact on the 
consensus reaching in GDM when decision makers are less tolerant to inconsistent views, 
defined by 𝜀, or the larger the non-cooperative behaviors in the group are, than otherwise. 
4.2 Simulation experiment II: The joint impact of non-cooperative behaviors and 
decisions rules on MCC 
Let 𝐶 = {𝑐1, 𝑐2, … , 𝑐𝑛} be the set of non-cooperative behavior coefficients, defined by unit
cost; 𝑆(𝐶) = ∑ 𝑐𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1  the sum of the non-cooperative behavior coefficients; and 𝐷(𝐶) =
(∑ [𝑐𝑖 − 𝑆(𝐶) 𝑛⁄ ]
2𝑛
𝑖=1 ) 𝑛⁄  the variance of the non-cooperative behavior coefficients. Let 
𝑤𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖 ∑ 𝑤𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1⁄ (𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛) and 𝑤𝑖 be randomly generated using normal distribution
𝑁(0.2, 𝜎𝑤
2) subject to the constraint 𝑤𝑖 > 0. Then, 𝜎𝑤
2  approximately measures the variance
of decision weights. 
The basic idea of Simulation experiment II is to randomly generate original individual 
opinions, and the values of 𝑤𝑖 (𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛). Then, we investigate the joint impact of
non-cooperative behaviors and decisions rules on MCC through 𝐶  and 𝜎𝑤
2 . Simulation 
experiment II can be formally presented as follows. 
Simulation experiment II: 
Input: The number of decision makers 𝑛, the variance of decision weights 𝜎𝑤
2 , the 
established threshold value 𝜀  and the non-cooperative behavior coefficient set 𝐶 =
{𝑐1, 𝑐2, … , 𝑐𝑛}.
Output: The minimum consensus cost, MCC. 
Step 1: Let 𝐴 = {𝑎1, 𝑎2, … , 𝑎𝑛} be the original individual opinion set of model P2 (or
model P3). where 𝑎𝑖 (𝑖 = 1,2,… , 𝑛) is randomly selected using the uniform distribution on
[0,1].. 
Step 2: Let 𝑊 = (𝑤1, 𝑤2, … , 𝑤𝑛)
𝑇 be decision weight of model P2 (or model P3), where
𝑤𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖 ∑ 𝑤𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1⁄  (𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛), and 𝑤𝑖  is randomly generated using normal distribution
𝑁(0.2, 𝜎𝑤
2) subject to the constraint 𝑤𝑖 > 0.
Step 3: Compute the MCC based on model P2 (or model P3). 
In order to reflect the impact of 𝐷(𝐶) on MCC, we consider eight non-cooperative 
behavior coefficients sets: 
𝐶1 = {3,3,3,3,3}，𝐶2 = {5,4,3,2,1}，𝐶3 = {1,2,7,3,2}，𝐶4 = {8,5,2,0,0}，
𝐶5 = {10,2,1,1,1}，𝐶6 = {1,2,3,4,5}，𝐶7 = {7,3,2,1,2}，𝐶8 = {0,0,8,5,2},
with same sum 𝑆(𝐶𝑘) = 15 (𝑘 = 1,2,… ,8) but different variance values:
𝐷(𝐶1) = 0, 𝐷(𝐶2) = 2, 𝐷(𝐶3) = 4.4, 𝐷(𝐶4) = 9.6,
𝐷(𝐶5) = 12.4, 𝐷(𝐶6) = 2, 𝐷(𝐶7) = 4.4, 𝐷(𝐶8) = 9.6.
We set different 𝜎𝑤
2   values and run Simulation experiment II 10,000 times to calculate the 
average of the MCC values, which are shown in Figs. 4 and 5.
Fig. 4 The difference of models P2 (OWA) and P3 (WA) on MCC with 𝑛 = 5 and 𝜀 = 0.05 
Fig. 5 The joint impact of 𝜎𝑤
2  and 𝐷(𝐶) on MCC 
From Figs. 4 and 5, we draw the following observations:  
(1) Fig. 4 shows that the MCC obtained with model P2 is larger than the one obtained with
model P3 under different parameters, which means that it is more difficult to reach consensus 
using OWA than using WA under the same decision weight.  
(2) In Fig. 5 (a), S(𝐶𝑘) = 15 (𝑘 = 1,2,3,4,5), 𝐷(𝐶1) < 𝐷(𝐶2) < 𝐷(𝐶3) < 𝐷(𝐶4) < 𝐷(𝐶5);
and in Fig. 5 (b), 𝑆(𝐶𝑘) = 15  (𝑘 = 2,3,4,6,8) , 𝐷(𝐶2) = 𝐷(𝐶6) < 𝐷(𝐶3) = 𝐷(𝐶7) <
𝐷(𝐶4) = 𝐷(𝐶8). Fig. 5 (a) shows that the MCC, obtained with model P2 and P3, slightly
fluctuate around the same fixed value as 𝜎𝑤
2  increases under the same 𝐷(𝐶) and 𝑆(𝐶) 
values. Fig. 5 (b) shows that larger 𝐷(𝐶) values lead to lower MCC under the same 𝑆(𝐶) 
values. This implies that decision rules, defined by decision weights and the aggregation 
functions, are insensitive to the MCC, while 𝐶, defined by 𝐷(𝐶) and 𝑆(𝐶), is a main 
determinant in influencing the MCC.  
4.3 Simulation experiment III: The impact of the consensus within the established target 
on MCC 
This section illustrates the relation between MCC and building a consensus opinion 𝑎𝑐 





∑ 𝑐𝑖|𝑎𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖|
𝑛
𝑖=1  
𝑎𝑐 = 𝐹𝑂𝑊𝐴(𝑎1, 𝑎2, … , 𝑎𝑛) 
|𝑎𝑖 − 𝑎
𝑐| ≤ 𝜀, 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛
𝑎 ≤ 𝑎𝑐 ≤ 𝑏       
,                        (17)
The basic idea of Simulation experiment III is to randomly generate original individual 
opinions, and the values of 𝑐𝑖 (𝑖 = 1,2,… , 𝑛) to investigate the effect of the consensus,
within the established target, on MCC through 𝜇𝑐, 𝜎𝑐
2, and [𝑎, 𝑏]. Simulation experiment III
can be formally presented as follows. 
Simulation experiment III: 
Input: The number of decision makers 𝑛 , the expectation of 𝑑𝑖 ’s non-cooperative
behavior coefficient 𝜇𝑐, the variance of 𝑑𝑖’s non-cooperative behavior coefficient 𝜎𝑐
2, the
established threshold value ε, decision weight 𝑤 = (𝑤1, 𝑤2, … , 𝑤𝑛)
𝑇 and the established
collective solution target range [𝑎, 𝑏]. 
Output: The minimum consensus cost, MCC. 
Step 1: Let 𝐴 = {𝑎1, 𝑎2, … , 𝑎𝑛} be the original individual opinion set in model P7, where
𝑎𝑖 (𝑖 = 1,2,… , 𝑛) is randomly selected using the uniform distribution on [0,1].
Step 2: Let 𝐶 = {𝑐1, 𝑐2, … , 𝑐𝑛} be the set of non-cooperative behavior coefficients in
model P7, where 𝑐𝑖 (𝑖 = 1,2,… , 𝑛)  is randomly generated using normal distribution
𝑁(𝜇𝑐 , 𝜎𝑐
2) subject to the constraint 𝑐𝑖 > 0.
Step 3: Compute the MCC based on model P7.  
Without loss of generality, in the simulation we consider two decision rules as follow: 
𝑂𝑊𝐴1 = (1 𝑛⁄ , … , 1 𝑛⁄ )
𝑇 and 𝑂𝑊𝐴2 = (0, 1 (𝑛 − 2)⁄ ,… , 1 (𝑛 − 2)⁄ , 0)
𝑇.
We set different values for 𝑛, 𝜀, 𝜇𝑐, 𝜎𝑐
2, [𝑎, 𝑏] and run Simulation experiment III 10,000
times to calculate the average of the MCC values, which is shown in Figs. 6 and 7. 
Fig. 6 Effects of [𝑎, 𝑏] and 𝜎𝑐
2 on the MCC under different parameters
Fig. 7 Effects of [𝑎, 𝑏] and 𝜇𝑐 on the MCC under different parameters
From Figs. 6 and 7, we draw the following observations:  
(1) Likewise to the observations previously drawn from Figs. 2 and 3, Figs. 6 and 7 also
show that the MCC increases as  𝜇𝑐  and 𝜎𝑐
2 increase under different parameters.
(2) Figs. 6 and 7 show that the MCC increases when the established collective solution
target range moves up from [0.5,0.6] to [0.9,1] through [0.6,0.7], [0.7,0.8], [0.8,0.9]，
which means that it is more difficult to achieve an extreme collective consensus opinion. 
Meanwhile, this inference is more obvious under larger non-cooperative behaviors in the 
group, defined by  𝜇𝑐 and 𝜎𝑐
2.
5. Conclusion
This paper studied the impact of decision rules and non-cooperative behaviors on MCC in
GDM. Theoretically, the decision rule that minimizes or maximizes MCC were derived. 
Furthermore, the joint impact of non-cooperative behaviors and decision rules on MCC were 
analyzed via simulation experiments.   
In general, a preference adjustment has associated a cost and the consensus reaching 
resources are limited, which implies that the results obtained in this paper can provide new 
perspectives to understand how decision rules and non-cooperative behaviors influence the 
consensus cost.  
Meanwhile, social network and opinion dynamics are becoming new tools to model CRP 
(Dong et al., 2018a; Gong et al., 2020), and we argue that it will be promising to investigate 
the consensus with minimum cost in social network and opinion dynamics contexts. In 
particular, it is very necessary to investigate the impact of decision rules and non-cooperative 
behaviors on MCC in social network and opinion dynamics contexts. 
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